Strain Theory by Robert Merton | An Analysis

Strain Theory by Robert Merton | An Analysis In criminology, the strain hypothesis depicts social structures inside society that may bolster individuals to complete wrongdoing. Following crafted by Emile Durkheim, Strain Theories have been bolstered by Robert King Merton, Albert K. Cohen, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, Robert Agnew, and Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld. Strain might be either: Basic: this applies to the methodology at the network level which separate and effect how one appointed authorities their necessities, for example in the event that particular social controls are inadequate or there is minimal guideline, this may adjust the people standpoint as to techniques and possibilities; or Singular: This term speaks to the antagonistic vibe and hindrances looked by people as they search for approaches to satisfy their necessities or wants, for example in the event that the standards of a general public become essential to an individual, in reality achieving them may turn out to be more noteworthy than the techniques. The History of Strain Theory Strain hypothesis was made from crafted by Durkheim and Merton and got from the hypothesis of anomie. Durkheim focused on the decrease of cultural control and the strain that was caused at the individual level, and Merton investigated the social association that is available between the individual and the norms of society. Anomie can be part into two separate levels. The first of these levels is the full scale side of anomie, which is evident in the limit of society to set up limitations on cultural standards and objectives, and eventually control a people lead. The smaller scale side of anomie, likewise called as strain hypothesis, is centered around the intentions hidden the greater likelihood of abnormality that aggregates from the breakdown of society. As per this small scale side of anomie, the decrease in cultural controls creates more want to perform degenerate activities (Agnew Passas, 1997:2-3). Agnew and Passas (1997) managed the likenesses between the large scale level of anomie and control hypothesis; in any case, they asserted that the smaller scale level hypothesis of strain ought to be decided in an unmistakable manner not quite the same as the control hypothesis. Agnew (1992:48) additionally differentiated and contrasted strain hypothesis with control hypothesis and social learning hypothesis. The hypotheses fluctuate in the sort of social connections that they underscore and the inspirations on which they are built up. The control hypothesis relies on the thought that the breakdown of society liberates the person to complete wrongdoing; strain hypothesis is spurred on the strain that is put on the individual to do wrongdoing (Agnew, 1992). Social learning hypothesis is established on the basics from a gathering that achieve a valuable or positive perspective on wrongdoing (Agnew, 1992). As per strain hypothesis, singular abnormality is made because of negative treatm ent from others, and this causes outrage and dissatisfaction (Agnew, 1997a). Control hypothesis, however, is established on the absence of noteworthy associations with non-freak others, for example family, church, and social learning hypothesis depends on positive collaborations with other that are viewed as freak. (Agnew, 1992). The allure of strain/anomie hypothesis started in the late 1960s attributable to the need of information introduced by investigators and the political and social condition of the decade (Agnew Passas, 1997). The absence of supporting proof can be because of numerous lacks in the first strategies utilized by the examiners (Agnew Passas, 1997). Speculation of the hypothesis and a numbness of the previous updates caused an assemblage of work that misshaped the first meaning of anomie/strain hypothesis (Agnew Passas, 1997). Along with these insufficiencies, present day scholars have asserted that observational proof in certainty bolsters the hypothesis (Agnew, Cullen, Burton, Evans, Gregory 1996). Mertons Strain Theory: Economic Goals, Educational Means Delinquency Throughout the entire existence of present day criminology, hardly any hypotheses have understood the effect of Mertons (1983) hypothesis of strain and abnormality. It has withstood 50 years regardless of a sizeable measure of writing contradicted to its hypothetical premise. Thwarted expectation with its experimental confirmation, then again, has made many dispose of it as a potential clarification for misconduct (Hirschi, 1969; Johnson, 1979; Kornhauser, 1978). Considering the way that the strain hypothesis joins both mental and auxiliary record for wrongdoing, its excusal would be a basic misfortune to criminology. Along with second thoughts about the centrality of social class in the introduction of wrongdoing, the forswearing of Mertons hypothesis of fundamentally instigated strain could make a run of the mill move toward speculations of individual conduct lacking auxiliary setting. The verifiable hugeness and one of a kind commitment of strain hypothesis merits a reconsideration before its last dismissal. Mertons unique clarification of strain was reprimanded for its hypothetical vulnerability (Cohen, 1955; Lindesmith Gagnon, 1964). For example, Merton gave instances of aberrance maybe connected with various strategies for modification in spite of the fact that he didn't offer any announcements in regards to the techniques by which each versatile strategy may affect different wrongdoing results (Clinard, 1964a). The outcomes of this kind of dubiousness are evident in preliminaries for the examination of strain impacts on adolescent wrongdoing. The hypothesis seems to imply that advancement causes utilitarian sorts of wrongdoing despite the fact that doesn't state whether strain explains regular sorts of adolescent wrongdoing for instance damage or individual violations of a non-utilitarian character (Gibbons Jones, 1975; Thio, 1975). The hypothesis is suggested with respect to whether strain ought to anticipate wrongdoing predominance or recurrence or both, or basic against non-basic sorts. Akers operationalization of Agnews hypothesis: Sources of strain Akers (2000) has operationalized Agnews rendition of the Strain Theory, as follows: Inability to accomplish decidedly esteemed objectives: the hole among desires and real accomplishments will get from short-and long haul individual objectives, and a portion of those objectives will never be acknowledged as a result of unavoidable conditions including both characteristic shortcomings and openings hindered by others; and the contrast between the perspective on what an individual accepts the result ought to be and what really results expands individual frustration. Disappointment isn't really because of any outside impedance with esteemed objectives, however an immediate impact on outrage, and effectsly affects genuine wrongdoing and hostility. Agnew and White (1992) have created exact proof proposing that general strain hypothesis was emphatically ready to relate delinquents and medication clients, and that the most grounded impact on the delinquents contemplated was the wrongdoing of their companions. They were keen on sedate use since it didn't seem to speak to an e ndeavor to coordinate outrage or break torment, however is utilized fundamentally to deal with the negative influence brought about by strain. Up to this stage, strain hypothesis had been connected with kinds of strain rather than wellsprings of strain while the pressure of ones environmental factors can be appeared to include with the desires for just and reasonable outcomes. These might be significant occasions or minor problems that development and dishearten after some time. Dissatisfaction causes frustration, harshness, and outrage all the feelings regularly connected with strain in criminology. It is typical for people to feel torment when they are rejected reasonable remunerations for their endeavors, particularly when estimated against the undertakings and pay given to others for comparable outcomes. Agnew (1992) manages outrage as the most unequivocal feeling as it is quite often pointed outwards and is commonly connected to breakdowns seeing someone. Study shows that the pressure/wrongdoing relationship appears to hold paying little mind to blame feelings, age, and ability to manage when occasions happen at the sa me time or in close arrangement. Robert Agnew In 1992, Agnew kept up that strain hypothesis could be essential in depicting wrongdoing and aberrance, anyway that it required audit with the goal that it was not appended to social class or social gauges; in any case, re-concentrated on self measures. He mapped out a general strain hypothesis that is neither auxiliary nor relational; nonetheless, passionate and propelled on a people direct economic wellbeing. He guaranteed that a people concrete or foreseen inability to acknowledge emphatically esteemed targets, real or anticipated expulsion of constructive qualities, and genuine or foreseen introduction of adverse inspiration all outcomes in strain. Strain shows up from negative associations with others. On the off chance that people are not managed in the manner that they envision or need to be managed, they will lose their trust in the job others play for accomplishing objectives. Outrage and frustration bolster unconstructive connections. This will for the most part include increasingly uneven activity since there will be a natural wish to stay away from undesirable dismissals, supporting progressively broad disengagement. In the event that particular dismissals are general sentiments that the circumstance is out of line or unreasonable, more grounded and progressively contrary emotions may motivate the individual to participate in wrongdoing. This is particularly valid for more youthful individuals, and Agnew suggested that review focus on the general , cash, term, and gathering of such upsetting occasions to see if an individual arrangement with strain in a lawbreaker or agreeable manner. He particularly discovered demeanor , insight, factors relational abilities, relationship with criminal companions and moderate social help significant components of self-adequacy. Robert Dubin Dubin (1959) made a decision about aberrance as an assignment of society, questioning the speculation that the degenerate activity coming about because of conditions of anomie is basically harming to society. For example, an individual in the formal condition is as yet playing by the guidelines and adding to society. The main abnormality lies in disposing of at least one of its recommended targets. Dubin kept up that Mertons fixation on the associations between societys focused on targets, and institutiona

Indian Camp and Soldiers Home Young Women as Objects Essay -- essays p

Indian Camp and Soldiers Home Young Women as Objects In Ernest Hemingway's short stories Indian Camp and Officer's Home, young ladies are treated as items whose reason for existing is either proliferation or joy. They don't and can't take an interest to a critical degree in the manly circle of understanding, and when they have filled their need, they are saved. They don't have a voice in the story, and they speak to difficulties in life that must be defeated somehow. While this depiction of young ladies is not really special to Hemingway, the creator utilizes it as a gadget to test the male mind all the more profoundly. *Paragraph Break*Indian Camp opens with an all-male guard of rowboats heading over the lake, with youthful Nick, his primary care physician father and his Uncle George off to see an Indian woman [who is] extremely wiped out. As they land on the opposite side and follow a youthful Indian bearing a lamp to the camp where labor is occurring, the men's managing interest isn't in the mother-to-be as an individual, however in her physiology as a contextual analysis. At the point when they locate her shouting in bed, Nick's dad dehumanizes her by saying: [Her] shouts are not significant. I don't hear them since they are not significant. *Paragraph Break*Bitten by the young lady during work aches, Uncle George responds instinctually: Damn squaw bitch! She isn't viewed as a co-member with the men administering the birth. Rather, she is just an article they are working on, a bitch soon to whelp her little guy, in a manner of speaking. The contemplated control of the dad and specialist as balanced man (DeFalco 30), a painstakingly developed posture, remains rather than the young lady's unintelligible powerlessness in labor. The comparing of the docto... ...on to abandon his old neighborhood with its plenty of wonders underscores his perspective on young ladies as irrelevant objects of joy. *Paragraph Break*Both Indian Camp and Fighter's Home place young ladies in an optional, externalized job. Hemingway adopts this strategy to concentrate consideration on the minds of his male heroes, self-fixated in their childhood or war-exhaustion. It may not charm the writer to women's activist perusers, however it makes for some ground-breaking short fiction. Book index: 1.DeFalco, Joseph. The Hero in Hemingway's Short Stories. College of Pittsburgh Press, 1963. 2.Flora, Joseph M. Ernest Hemingway: A Study of the Short Fiction. G.K. Lobby and Co., 1989. 3.Westbrook, Max. Beauty under Tension: Hemingway and the Summer of 1920. Ernest Hemingway: The Writer in Context. Ed. James Nagel. College of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

How OCD and Traumatic Brain Injury Are Linked

How OCD and Traumatic Brain Injury Are Linked OCD Related Conditions Print The Link Between OCD and Traumatic Brain Injury By Owen Kelly, PhD Updated on August 09, 2019 RunPhoto / Getty Images More in OCD Related Conditions Causes Symptoms and Diagnosis Treatment Types Living With OCD Traumatic brain injury (TBI) caused by motor vehicle accidents, falls or other accidents and firearms can cause a wide variety of cognitive issues. In addition to cognitive problems, if youve experienced a brain injury, you may also develop symptoms consistent with one or more forms of mental illness including obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). TBI occurs when the brain is injured or damaged by an outside force such as a blow to the head or a gunshot. TBIs can occur as a closed head injury in which the skull and brain remain intact, like what is seen among professional athletes such as football players, or as a penetrating head injury in which an object penetrates the skull and brain. TBI is often classified according to the severity of the injuryâ€"mild, moderate or severe. Common Changes Caused by Traumatic Brain Injury If you have experienced a TBI you may also notice a change in your cognitive functioning. After a TBI, your performance on everyday tasks requiring memory, language, spatial or verbal ability may be negatively affected. This can be either temporarily or permanently. If the TBI affects motor centers within the brain, mobility may also be impaired, and you may need a mobility device like a wheelchair or help with day to day tasks. TBI can also affect your behavior, causing changes in your personality. It is possible, after a TBI, that a previously calm person may become impulsive or aggressive. Likewise, an outgoing individual may become shy and withdrawn. TBI and Symptoms of OCD In addition to changes in cognitive function, behavior, and mobility, TBI can trigger symptoms of OCD including obsessions and compulsions. OCD following a TBI usually occurs soon, if not immediately, after the event has taken place. However, there have been reports of TBI-induced OCD being diagnosed months after the initial injury. In each case, localized brain damage may or may not be present when viewing a brain scan. Research has indicated that OCD following a TBI is usually accompanied by symptoms of major depression. Whether this depression is a result of the TBI, the psychosocial stress caused by the injury, the onset of OCD, or a combination of these factors is unclear. Treating TBI-Related OCD If you developed OCD after a traumatic brain injury, your doctor may recommend a  selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors such as Prozac (fluoxetine) or a  tricyclic antidepressant  such as Anafranil (clomipramine). Psychotherapy for OCD following a TBI may also be helpful. However, since cognitive impairment is common among those with TBI, cognitive-based therapies may not be the best option for everyone and should be evaluated on a case by case basis. If you can, choose a supportive therapy which assists you and helps you cope with both the practical and emotional challenges associated with TBI and OCD. The 9 Best Online Therapy Programs

The Incredible Place that is Cuba - 868 Words

Cuba, Cuba, Cuba! Ranging from grassy plains to gentle hills, from steep mountainsides to calm waters of the beach, Cuba is truly one of the most fascinating places in the world. From the capital city of Havana, to the less populated areas like Guisa, Cuba is highly regarded as a shockingly beautiful location. However, behind all of the beauty, there is a world of history and culture. In fact, located in the Caribbean, Cuba provides an incredible blend of rich history, interesting geography, and unique culture. Geography Located just over 90 miles from the tip of Florida (Nation Facts), Cuba is home to a wide range of interesting geography. Cuba is bordered by only the North Atlantic Ocean to the north, and the Caribbean Sea to†¦show more content†¦This 99.8% literacy rate also leads perfectly into a literature-filled Cuban culture. One of the most famous authors in the country, Leonardo Padura was the 2012 winner of Cuba’s national prize for literature. (World Literature Today) Recently, â€Å"World Literature Today† interviewed Leonardo Padura about his books and what they meant to him and others. When asked about what he thinks his novels remember or bring up, Padura gives the answer â€Å"I believe my novels, at the very least, reflect a lot of things that have been forgotten but that I haven’t wanted to forget.† (World Literature Today). Padura’s first US publication will be The Man Who Loved Dogs (World Literature Today). It was not just Cuban write rs that have made a name for themselves in Cuba, though. Ernest Hemingway spent a lot of his time in Cuba, and even wrote a book called From Whom the Bell Tells while there (Nation Facts). On a different note, the only legally bought cars in cub were those from before 1959 (Nation Facts). This goes to show that time has played crucial role in Cuban history and culture. However, while many of these things can explain culture, there is perhaps no better indicator of culture than a country’s main imports and exports. Cuba’s main imports are petroleum, food, machinery, equipment, and chemicals (Central Intelligence Agency). Some of the chief exports of Cuba are petroleum, nickel, medical products, sugar, tobacco, fish, citrus,Show MoreRelatedFidel Castro Led The Cuban Revolution934 Words   |  4 Pagesago, an embargo was placed on Cuba, halting all trade between the two countries. Fidel Castro led the Cuban Revolution, which began in July of 1953, leading to their victor y and the previous leader, Fulgencio Batista, being driven out of his position. Castro had gained a lot of support from Cuban citizens with his promises to restore political and civil liberties. Castro later began to stray from these promises, starting by nationalizing American businesses within Cuba and by presenting anti-AmericanRead MoreFidel Castro Led The Cuban Revolution1106 Words   |  5 PagesFor centuries, Cuba s greatest resource has been its people. - Pico Iyer Nearly fifty-five years ago, an embargo was placed on Cuba, halting all trade between the two countries. Fidel Castro led the Cuban Revolution, which began in July of 1953, leading to their victory and the previous leader, Fulgencio Batista, surrendering from his position. Castro was an American friend and had gained a great deal of support from Cuban citizens with his promises to restore basic, essential liberties. CastroRead More Cuban Missle Crisis Essay1196 Words   |  5 Pagescame to full-scale nuclear war. When the Soviet Union placed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy interpreted the act as one of hostility that would not be tolerated. However, the situation was blown way out or proportion by the president, American media, and ultimately the citizens of the United States. The Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was reacting to the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba, US Missile installations along the Turkey/Soviet border, and the clear anti-Communist policyRead M oreThe Battle Of The Uss Maine1458 Words   |  6 Pagesbirth of a western hemispheric super power, the United States. The sinking of the USS Maine, the use of yellow press journalism, and the national uproar and motivation is what drove the Americans to victory. Valeriano Weyler, the Spanish General in Cuba, started a campaign called Subjugation or Death. This bloody campaign was Spain’s attempt to force the local people into slavery. Filled with concentration camps, burning villages and murdering Cubans, this campaign took the lives of over 200,000 CubanRead MoreEssay about The Cuban Missile Crisis1349 Words   |  6 Pagesmade settling disputes difficult. In the 1960’s the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, faced some major challenges. One major event that took place during his Presidency was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis was an extremely intense time for the U.S. They learned that the Soviets set up missile bases in Cuba only ninety miles from Florida1. The American people were surrounded by the threat of nuclear war. The initial discovery that the Soviets were planning againstRead MoreThe Technological Accessibility And Socioeconomic Mobility Of Cuban Workers947 Words   |  4 PagesSanta Maria (CSM) causeway in Cuba. The design of the causeway functioned as a method of connecting small parchments of man-made land to the larger archipelagos. Despite the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in ‘05, the causeway remained proportionately intact. During my visit in ‘11, however, the causeway was noted for its damaged bridges still in need of further repair1. The causeway itself (for the most part) is unlit. Due to the (prior) partisan embargo against Cuba, the CSM is a main artery forRead MoreThe Technological Accessibility And Socioeconomic Mobility Of Cuban Workers Essay905 Words   |  4 PagesSanta Maria (CSM) causeway in Cuba. The design of the causeway functioned as a method of connecting small parchments of man-made land to the larger archipelagos. Despite the devastation of Hurrican e Katrina in ‘08, the causeway remained portionately intact. During my visit in ‘11, however, the causeway was noted for its damages bridges still in need of further repair1. The causeway itself (for the most part) is unlit. Due to (prior) partisan economic sanctions against Cuba, the CSM is a main artery forRead MoreThe Great Day Of My Life1395 Words   |  6 PagesRoosevelt once described his service in the Spanish-American War as â€Å"the great day of my life† (www.nps.com). Roosevelt’s incredible leadership ability was first put to the test and demonstrated during the Battle of Las Guasimas as he braved a hail of enemy fire from horseback and led his men to a flanking position that broke the back of the Spanish forces and sent them into retreat. Following this action, Col. Wood was promoted to General, and Roosevelt was promoted to Colonel, giving him commandRead MoreThe Assassination Of The United States1487 Words   |  6 PagesPresident Kennedyâ⠂¬â„¢s assassination produced inconclusive evidence that they stated as conclusive evidence in the case against Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone shooter. The Warren Commission was established in 1963, one week after the assassination took place. President Johnson, Kennedy s Vice President created the commission in an attempt to further understand the motives behind the malicious attack. Almost one year after the assassination the Warren Commission published their 888 page report filled withRead MoreThe Cuban Revolution1583 Words   |  7 Pagesrule of Batista between 1940 and 1944 Cuba seemed to be making steady progress towards being a democratic and sovereign nation, which was a huge turn over from it’s previous status as either a colony of Spain or being completely unatonomous under the Platt Amendment. The constitution put into place by Batista in 1940 also curried him more favor in the eyes of the Cuban people. It extended rights beyond cookie cutter Western ideals of de mocracy and â€Å"committed Cuba to land reform and social jutice, including

Why Smoking Should Be Banned - 884 Words

Introduction Paragraph A. Every wonder why people smoke? Is smoking really healthy for them? How much does it cost an individual to smoke? What are the costs to society when people smoke? These are all questions that can easily be taken care of by banning cigarette smoking. It is really a disgusting sight to see a woman with a cigarette hanging out of her mouth. It is equally bad to see children with smoking cigarettes. B. Cigarette smoking should be banned, not only in restaurants but everywhere. When someone smokes cigarettes it affects the entire population, causes people to die prematurely, and creates a significant financial problem for society. II. Topic Background Paragraph (The Warrant) A. Background information needed to give to the audience for them to understand why cigarette smoking should be banned includes studies done on the effects of smoking. It will also include data on the cigarettes themselves. Background information will also include an analysis of the cost of cigarettes. Effects on health insurance will also be examined. B. The backing sources where the information will come from include the Food and Drug Administration and the Social Science Research Solutions under contract with Harvard School of Public Health. These studies and others will provide the necessary information to provide a very effective argument for banning cigarette smoking. III. Key Definitions Paragraph (The Warrant) A. Key terms that will need to be defined for the audienceShow MoreRelatedWhy Smoking Should Be Banned849 Words   |  4 PagesI will be discussing the topic why smoking should be banned in the workplace (inside and outside). I’ll be covering the loss of productivity in the workplace and the benefits of a smoke free workplace. In my opinion smoking should be banned in the workplace because the productivity is what makes a business and the benefits are a healthier and safer environment producing a better corporate image. Productivity in the workplace for a smoker to a nonsmoker is very different. Firstly i’ll be writingRead MoreArgumentative Essay About Why Smoking Should Be Banned1047 Words   |  5 PagesBan Smoking in Public Places Smoking is one of the leading causes of preventable deaths in the United States, and doing it in public is even worse because smokers not only harm themselves, but also those around them. I remember how my great uncle would always smoke in his house regardless of his surroundings. When his daughter visited him for a vacation, she brought her three year old daughter with her. The baby was healthy before coming to her grandpas house, but in less than two weeks, sheRead MoreBans on Smoking in Public Areas1476 Words   |  6 Pagesnumber by four, you get the number of people that die because of smoking each year! Smoking is the leading preventable cause of death in the U.S. Each year more than 480,000 people die because of smoking. This is just one of the many reasons why I believe that cigarette smoking should be banned in public areas. I will argue this point in three ways. First, I will argue that the health effects of smoking are so harmful that cigarettes should not be allowed in public areas. Next, I will argue that the negativeRead MoreEssay about Cigarettes Should be Banned939 Words   |  4 PagesSmoking cigarettes is common among most adults in the United States, yet it is one of the most dangerous things you can do to yourself. Many people feel that smoking should be made illegal. The reason they may feel this way is because it is very harmful to your health and can lead to death. I strongly agree that cigarettes should be banned from being sold and produced because to me they’re considered a dangerous drug. The first reason that supports my claim of smoking cigarettes should be Read MoreThe Production of Cigarettes Should Be Banned Across the U.S1132 Words   |  5 PagesOne thing I hate is when someone is walking in front of me smoking a cigarette and next thing you know, BOOM the cigarette smoke comes right to my face! If you are that smoker it created many health problems and chances are you have to take many medications every morning before your day begins, does it become annoying? Smoking is an activity that has been around for many years, it helps reduce the stresses of life and put people in a comfortable position that enables them to cope with the hecticRead MoreShould Cigarette Smoking Be Banned?1365 Words   |  6 PagesShould Cigarette Smoking be banned? The United States Surgeon General’s report stated that cigarette smoking is the major single cause of cancer death in the United States. This statement is so true today. Smoking a cigarette is an acquired behavior and that makes it the most preventable cause of death in our society. Cigarettes contain nicotine, tar, and carbon monoxide, as well as formaldehyde, ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic, and DDT. The main ingredient in cigarettes is tobacco. The nicotineRead MoreShould Cigarettes Be Banned in the U.S.?1444 Words   |  6 Pageshealth implications to the user and the people around him or her. Aside from these health implications, cigarettes should not be banned in the U.S. because of the exaggeration of the results of secondhand smoking, the similarity of the Prohibition era, the devastation of the U.S. economy, and the freedom of one’s own actions. The two main reasons why people want cigarettes to be banned is because of the health implications it causes to oneself and others around him or her and the addictive chemicalsRead MoreShould Cigarettes Be Banned in the U.S.?1400 Words   |  6 PagesShould Cigarettes Be Banned in the U.S.? Tobacco has been around in the world for over 2.5 million years. It was not until a few hundred years ago when the tobacco industry decided to put these crops into use and conjure up tobacco products for the community. A popular tobacco product in society is cigarettes, as they are cheap and simple to use. As long as one is over eighteen, acquiring cigarettes is a straightforward process for a reasonable price, albeit the sin tax. It was not until recentlyRead MoreEssay about Smoking Should be Banned in All Public Places1133 Words   |  5 PagesSmoking Should be Banned in All Public Places Every year thousands of people die because of having cancer or other tobacco related illnesses due to smoking. Smoking is seen everywhere from our own television screens to even the world wide web; the internet. Tobacco is the substance that is in these cigarettes. These tobacco products are promoted through tobacco ads that are found almost everywhere you turn. They are in magazines, television screens, on the internetRead MoreThe Negative Effects Of Smoking In Public Places1157 Words   |  5 Pages Smoking should be banned in public places The government of the United States, should ban smoking in all public places because of the adverse effects of passive smoking on smokers, non-smokers and the environment. In the recent years, the population of people who smoke in the US has significantly increased. People still choose to smoke even when they have adequate knowledge of how unhealthy smoking can be. Smoking is a personal choice for any individual. Moreover, it is a highly addictive habit

Economic Interdependence Free Essays

string(239) " notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods\." Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations Author(s): Dale C. Copeland Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. We will write a custom essay sample on Economic Interdependence or any similar topic only for you Order Now 4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 5-41 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/2539041 Accessed: 12/10/2010 13:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=mitpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor. org. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www. jstor. org Economic DaleC. Copeland Interdependence and War A Theory of Trade Expectations Does economic inter- dependence increase or decrease the probability of war among states? With the Cold War over, this question is taking on importance as trade levels between established powers such as the United States and Russia and emerging powers such as Japan, China, and Western Europe grow to new heights. In this article, I provide a new dynamic theory to help overcome some of the theoretical and empirical problems with current liberal and realist views on the question. The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities. Economic interdependence is the only factor that plays an important causal role in the thinking of both camps, and their perspectives are diametrically opposed. Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression: interdependent states would rather trade than invade. As long as high levels of Dale C. Copelands AssistantProfessorn the Department f Governmentnd ForeignAffairsat the i i o a University f V irginia. o For their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article, I would like to thank Robert Art, V. Natasha Copeland, Michael Desch, Angela Doll, John Duffield, Matthew Evangelista, Richard Falkenrath, James Fearon, Joseph Grieco, Atsushi Ishida, Irving Lachow, Alastair lain Johnston, Andrew Kydd, Jack Levy, Lisa Martin, Michael Mastanduno, John Mearsheimer, Andrew Moravcsik, John Owen, Paul Papayoanou, Stephen Rhoads, Gideon Rose, Richard Rosecrance, Len Schoppa, Herman Schwartz, Randall Schweller, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, David Waldner, and Stephen Walt. This article also benefited from presentations at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security at the University of Chicago; the University of Virginia Department of Government’s faculty workshop; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995; the Olin security workshop at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; and the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (under whose auspices it was written). All errors remain mine. 1. For a summary of the causal variables in the two schools, see John J. Mearsheimer, â€Å"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,†InternationalSecurity, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Robert 0. Keohane, â€Å"International Liberalism Reconsidered,† in John Dunn, ed. , The EconomicLimits to ModernPolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 165-194. InternationalSecurity, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41 ? 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 6 interdependence can be maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism. Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security. Accordingly, interdependence-meaning mutual dependence and thus vulnerability-gives states an incentive to initiate war, if only to ensure continued access to necessary materials and goods. The unsatisfactory nature of both liberal and realist theories is shown by their difficulties in explaining the run-ups to the two World Wars. The period up to World War I exposes a glaring anomaly for liberal theory: the European powers had reached unprecedented levels of trade, yet that did not prevent them from going to war. Realists certainly have the correlation right-the war was preceded by high interdependence-but trade levels had been high for the previous thirty years; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient. At first glance, the period from 1920 to 1940 seems to support liberalism over realism. In the 1920s, interdependence was high, and the world was essentially peaceful; in the 1930s, as entrenched protectionism caused interdependence to fall, international tension rose to the point of world war. Yet the two most aggressive states in the system during the 1930s, Germany and Japan, were also the most highly dependent despite their efforts towards autarchy, relying on other states, including other great powers, for critical raw materials. Realism thus seems correct in arguing that high dependence may lead to conflict, as states use war to ensure access to vital goods. Realism’s problem with the interwar era, however, is that Germany and Japan had been even more dependent in the 1920s, yet they sought war only in the late 1930s when their dependence, although still significant, had fallen. The theory presented in this article-the theory of trade expectations-helps to resolve these problems. The theory starts by clarifying the notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods. You read "Economic Interdependence" in category "Essay examples" The total of the benefits and potential costs of trade versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of adjusting its economy to the new situation. Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war. This supplements the static Economicnterdependence War| 7 and I consideration in liberalism and realism of the levels of interdependence at any point in time, with the importance of leaders’ dynamic expectations into the future. Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions. Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future. If highly interdependent states expect that trade will be severely restricted-that is, if their expectations for future trade are low-realists are likely to be right: the most highly dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war, for fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their long-term security. In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade. This dynamic perspective helps bridge the gaps within and between current approaches. Separating levels of interdependence from expectations of future trade indicates that states may be pushed into war even if current trade levels are high, if leaders have good reason to suspect that others will cut them off in the future. In such a situation, the expected value of trade will likely be negative, and hence the value of continued peace is also negative, making war an attractive alternative. This insight helps resolve the liberal problem with World War I: despite high trade levels in 1913-14, declining expectations for future trade pushed German leaders to attack, to ensure long-term access to markets and raw materials. Even when current trade is low or non-existent, positive expectations for future trade will produce a positive expected value for trade, and therefore an incentive for continued peace. This helps explain the two main periods of detente between the Cold War superpowers, from 1971 to 1973 and in the late 1980s: positive signs from U. S. eaders that trade would soon be significantly increased coaxed the Soviets into a more cooperative relationship, reducing the probability of war. But in situations of low trade where there is no prospect that high trade levels will be restored in the future, highly dependent states may be pushed into conflict. This was the German and Japanese dilemma before World War II. The article is divided into three sections. The first section reviews liberal and realist theories on the relationship between economic interdependence and the probability of war, and provides a critique of both theories. The second section lays out trade expectations theory The final section examines the diplomatic historical evidence for the new theory against two significant cases: Germany Internationalecurity20:4 | 8 S before World War I and Germany before World War II. The evidence indicates that the new variable, expectations of future trade, helps resolve the anomalies for current theories: in both cases, negative expectations for future trade, combined with high dependence, led leaders into total war out of fear for their long-term economic position and therefore security. TheLiberal nd RealistDebateon Economic nterdependence a I War and The core liberal position is straightforward. 2 Trade provides valuable benefits, or â€Å"gains from trade,† to any particular state. A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than war, so dependent states should prefer to trade not invade. This argument is often supported by the auxiliary proposition that modern technology greatly increases the costs and risks of aggression, making the trading option even more rational. The argument was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden, who asserted that free trade â€Å"unites† states, â€Å"making each equally anxious for the prosperity and happiness of both. â€Å"3 This view was restated in The GreatIllusion by Norman Angell just prior to World War I and again in 1933. Angell saw states having to choose between new ways of thinking, namely peaceful trade, and the â€Å"old method† of power politics. Even if war was once profitable, modernization now makes it impossible to â€Å"enrich† oneself through force; indeed, by destroying trading bonds, war is â€Å"commercially suicidal. 4 Why do wars nevertheless occur? While the start of World War I just after The GreatIllusion’s initial publication might seem to refute his thesis, Angell in 2. Four other subsidiary liberal arguments, employing intervening variables, are not sufficiently compelling to discuss here. The first suggests that high trade levels promote domest ic prosperity, thereby lessening the internal problems that push leaders into war. The second argues that interdependence helps to foster increased understanding between peoples, which reduces the misunderstandings that lead to war. The third asserts that trade alters the domestic structure of states, heightening the influence of groups with a vested interest in peaceful trade. The final argument contends that trade has the â€Å"spill-over† effect of increasing political ties between trading partners, thus improving the prospects for long-term cooperation. For an critical analysis of these views, see Dale Copeland, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War,†paper presented to University of Virginia Department of Government’s faculty workshop, March 1995. 3. Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1903), p. 225. 4. Norman Angell, The GreatIllusion, 2d ed. (New York: G. P Putnam’s Sons, 1933), pp. 33, 59-60, 87-89. Economicnterdependence WarI 9 I and the 1933 edition argued that the debacle simply confirmed the unprofitability of modern wars. He thus upheld the common liberal view that wars, especially major wars, result from the misperceptions of leaders caught up in the outmoded belief that war still pays. Accordingly, his is â€Å"not a plea for the impossibility of war †¦ but for its futility,† since â€Å"our ignorance on this matter makes war not only possible, but extremely likely. 5 In short, if leaders fail to see how unprofitable war is compared to the benefits of trade, they may still erroneously choose the former. Richard Rosecrance provides the most extensive update of the CobdenAngell thesis to the nuclear era. States must choose between being â€Å"trading states,† concerned with promoting wealth through commerce, and â⠂¬Å"territorial states,† obsessed with military expansion. Modern conditions push states towards a predominantly trading mode: wars are not only too costly, but with the peaceful trading option, â€Å"the benefits that one nation gains from trade can also be realized by others. When the system is highly interdependent, therefore, the â€Å"incentive to wage war is absent,† since â€Å"trading states recognize that they can do better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land. â€Å"6 Rosecrance thus neatly summarizes the liberal view that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading. 7 5. Ibid. , pp. 59-62, 256. i S a 6. RichardRosecrance,TheRise of the Trading tate:Commercend Conquestn the ModernWorld (New York: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 3-14; 24-25 (emphasis added); see also Rosecrance, â€Å"War, a Trade and Int erdependence,† in James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp, eds. , Interdependence nd Conflict in WorldPolitics (Aldershot, U. K. : Avebury, 1989), pp. 48-57; Rosecrance, â€Å"A New Concert of Powers,† Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82. 7. A book often seen as a statement on the peace-inducing effects of interdependence-Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)-actually contains no such causal argument. For Keohane and Nye, â€Å"complex interdependence† is more peaceful by definition: it is a valuable concept for analyzing the political process† only when military force is â€Å"unthinkable† (pp. 29, 24). In the second edition: â€Å"since we define complex interdependence in terms of [policy] goals and instruments,† arguments â€Å"about how goals and instruments are affected by the degree to which a situation approximates complex interdependence or realism will be tautologic al. † Thus, â€Å"we are left essentially with two dependent variables: changes in agendas and changes in the roles of international organizations. † Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, d ed. (Glenview, Ill. Scott, Foresman, 1989), p. 255; emphasis in original. 2 The dependent variable of this article-the likelihood of war-is nowhere to be found, which is not surprising, since it is assumed away. Other works on interdependence from the 1970s, which largely examined dependent variables other than war, are discussed in Copeland, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War. † InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 10 Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war. States concerned about security will dislike dependence, since it means that crucial imported goods could be cut off during a crisis. This problem is particularly acute for imports l ike oil and raw materials; while they may be only a small percentage of the total import bill, without them most modern economies would collapse. Consequently, states dependent on others for vital goods have an increased incentive to go to war to assure themselves of continued access of supply. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz puts the argument as follows: actors within a domestic polity have little reason to fear the dependence that goes with specialization. The anarchic structure of international politics, however, makes states worry about their vulnerability, thus compelling them â€Å"to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency. † For Waltz, it is this â€Å"simple thought† that explains, among other things, â€Å"their imperial thrusts to widen the scope of their control. â€Å"9 For John Mearsheimer, nations that â€Å"depend on others for critical economic supplies will fear cutoff or blackmail in time of crisis or war. † Consequently, â€Å"they may try to extend political control to the source of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers. Interdependence, therefore, â€Å"will probably lead to greater security competition. â€Å"10 8. One might contend that realists doubt the causal importance of economic interdependence, since relative gains concerns convince great powers to avoid becoming dependent in the first place. Aside from arguments showing why states may cooperate despite concerns for relative gains (see essays by Powell, Snidal, and Keohane in David A. Baldwin, ed. , Neorealismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary ebate [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993]; Dale Copeland, â€Å"Why Relative D Gains Concerns May Promote Economic Cooperation: A Realist Explanation for Great Power Interdependence,† presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1996), the argument is empirically false. Periods of high interdependence have arisen even when the security competition between great powers was particularly intense, such as from 1880 to 1914, as Waltz acknowledges. Kenneth Waltz, â€Å"The Myth of Interdependence,† in Ray Maghoori and Bennett Ramberg, Globalism versus Realism (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1982), p. 83. Since the reality of high interdependence cannot be argued or assumed away, I focus here on the core realist claim that whenever high levels of interdependence are reached, for whatever reason, war is more likely. 9. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of InternationalPolitics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 106. 10. John J. Mearsheimer, â€Å"Disorder Restored,† in Graham Allison and Gregory F Treverton, eds. , Rethinking America’s Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 223; Mearsheimer, â€Å"Back to the Future,† p. 45. See also Robert Gilpin, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective,† in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds. , Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kan. : Allen, 1977), p. 29. Adopting the realist argument, but emphasizing how dependence leads states to adopt destabilizing offensive strategies, is Anne Uchitel, â€Å"Interdepend- Economicnterdependence War| 11 and I This modern realist understanding of economic interdependence and war finds its roots in mercantilist writings dating from the seventeenth century Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power. For mercantilists, imperial expansionthe acquisition of colonies-is driven by the state’s need to secure greater control over sources of supply and markets for its goods, and to build relative power in the process. By allowing the metropole and the colonies to specialize in production and trade of complementary products (particularly manufactured goods for raw materials), while ensuring political control over the process, colonies  "opened up the possibility of providing a system of supply within a self-contained empire. â€Å"‘2 In this, we see the underpinning for the neorealist view that interdependence leads to war. Mercantilist imperialism represents a reaction to a state’s dependence; states reduce their fears of external specialization by increasing internal specialization within a now larger political realm. The imperial state as it expands thus acquires more and more of the characteristics of Waltz’s domestic polity, with its hierarchy of specialized functions secure from the unpredictable policies of others. In sum, realists seek to emphasize one main point: political concerns driven by anarchy must be injected into the liberal calculus. Since states must be primarily concerned with security and therefore with control over resources and markets, one must discount the liberal optimism that great trading partners will always continue to be great trading partners simply because both states benefit absolutely. Accordingly, a state vulnerable to another’s policies because of dependence will tend to use force to overcome that vulnerability. ence and Instability,† in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds. , Coping with Complexityin the International System (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1993), pp. 43-264. For Barry Buzan, since liberal free-trading systems are dependent on a hegemon which invariably declines, such systems are destined to fall into â€Å"malevolent† mercantilist practices, as states scramble to control access to goods formerly safeguarded by the hegemon. Avoiding the liberal system altogether, through a â€Å"benign† mercantilist system of self-sufficient trading blocs, will be the refore preferred. Buzan, â€Å"Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,† International Organization, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), esp. pp. 597, 609-623. For a similar argument, see Robert Gilpin, U. S. Power and the Multinational Corporation(New York: Basic Books), 1975, p. 259. 11. See Eli F Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London: George Allen, 1931), p. 15; Jacob Viner, â€Å"Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,† World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 10; David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft(Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1985), chap. . 12. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, p. 40. InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 12 A COMPARISON OF THE LIBERAL AND REALIST PERSPECTIVES While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founde d on an individual state’s decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term â€Å"interdependence,† both derive predictions from with their own specific how particular decision-making units-states-deal dependence. This allows both theories to handle situations of â€Å"asymmetric interdependence,† where one state in a dyad is more dependent than the other. Their predictions are internally consistent, but opposed: liberals argue that the more dependent state is less likely to initiate conflict, since it has more to lose from breaking economic ties;13 realists maintain that this state is more likely to initiate conflict, to escape its vulnerability. The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence. The realist argument highlights an aspect that is severely downplayed in the liberal argument, namely, consideration of the potential costs from the severing of a trading relationship. Most liberals, if pressed, would probably accept David Baldwin’s conceptualization of dependence as the opportunity costs a state would experience should trade end. Yet Baldwin’s opportunity costs are only the loss of the benefits from trade received after a state moves from autarchy. 14 It is this understanding of opportunity costs that is followed in the most comprehensive liberal argument for interdependence and peace, that of Rosecrance. There is little sense in Rosecrance’s work that a state’s decision to specialize and thus to restructure its economy radically can entail huge â€Å"costs of adjustment† should trade be later severed, nor that such costs can actually put the state in a far worse position than if it had never moved from autarchy in the first place. 15 This is the concern of realists when they talk about dependence on 13. See Keohane and Nye, â€Å"World Politics and the International Economic System,† in C. Fred Bergsten, ed. , The Future of the InternationalEconomicOrder (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 121122; Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegley, â€Å"Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance,† International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 191-222. 14. David A. Baldwin, â€Å"Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,† International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 478, 482-484, 489; Baldwin, â€Å"The Power of Positive Sanctions,† WorldPolitics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19-38; Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade,exp. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), chap. . 15. On the costs of adjustment, see Ruth Arad, Seev Hirsch, and Alfred Tovias, The Economicsof Peacemaking(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 26-34. Keohane and Nye examine the â€Å"costs of adjusting† as an integral part of â€Å"vulnerability† interdependence (Power and Interdependence, p. 13). Yet they do not establish the original autarchic po sition as a baseline for examining these costs independently from the benefits of trade forgone; this baseline is incorporated later in EconomicInterdependence nd War | 13 a â€Å"vital goods† such as oil. A state that chooses not to buy oil from outsiders forgoes certain benefits of trade, but by operating on domestic energy sources, it avoids the heavy penalty experienced by a state that does base its industrial structure on imported oil, only to find itself cut off from supplies. That Rosecrance minimizes this realist concern is evident. In an explicit effort to refute Waltz’s definition of interdependence as â€Å"a trading link which ‘is costly to break’,† Rosecrance contends that â€Å"to measure interdependence in this way misses the essence of the concept. His subsequent discussion emphasizes only the benefits that states give up if they choose not to trade (his â€Å"opportunity costs†), and makes no mention of any potentially severe costs of adjustment. In fact, he argues that dependence on such things as foreign sources of energy is really no different than relying on outsiders for â€Å"fashions† or different makes of cars; if trade is cut off, a state loses only â€Å"consumer choice. † Recognition that the whole industrial structure of a state might be undermined or destroyed by an adversary’s severing of vital trade is absent. 6 Rosecrance is reluctant to acknowledge realist concerns, perhaps because to do so would imply that dependent states might be more willing to go to war, as realists maintain, while Rosecrance is arguing that they are less willing to do so. 17 This points to a critical distinction between liberalism and realism that illuminates the liberal understanding of why wars ultimately occur. For liberals, interdependence does not have a downside that might push states into war, as realists contend. Rather, interdependence is seen to operate as a restraint on aggressive tendencies arising from the domestic or individual levels. If interdependence becomes low, this restraint is taken away, allowing the aggressive tendencies to dominate. To borrow a metaphor from Plato: for liberals, inter- building the new theory. Liberals also consider â€Å"costs† in terms of losses in â€Å"autonomy† due to trade ties; see Richard N. Cooper, The Economicsof Interdependence New York:McGraw Hill, 1968), ( pp. 4-12; Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, pp. 39-41, 235. Note, however, that these are costs that go hand in hand with high trade, not costs that are experienced if trade is cut off. Hence, these losses in autonomy are more accurately considered as a form of sensitivity interdependencecosts incurred when trade is ongoing-rather than as a form of â€Å"vulnerability† interdependence so worrying to realists. On this, see Keohane and Nye, â€Å"International Interdependence and Integration,† in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. , Handbook of Political Science, vol. 8 (Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 368-370. 16. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, pp. 144-145. In the appendix, an iterated prisoner’s dilemma is used to show the â€Å"concrete benefits† from trade cooperation. If states decide not to cooperate, they simply â€Å"[do] not benefit†; pp. 233-236. 17. Rosecrance occasionally seems to accept that some goods are more vital than others, but even here he reiterates the liberal argument: â€Å"Countries dependent on the world economy for markets, assistance, and critical raw materials are doubly hesitant to embark on military adventures†; ibid. , p. 133, emphasis added. InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 14 dependence operates like the reins on the dark horse of inner passions; it provides a material incentive to stay at peace, even when there are internal predispositions towards aggression. Remove the reins, however, and these passions are free to roam as they will. 18 This point becomes clearer as one examines Rosecrance’s explanations for the two World Wars. World War II, for Rosecrance, was ultimately domestically driven. The main aggressors saw war as a means to cope with the upheavals flowing from â€Å"social discontent and chaos† and the â€Å"danger of left-wing revolutions†; given these upheavals, it is â€Å"not surprising that the territorial and military-political system [i. e. , war] emerged as an acceptable alternative to more than one state. Connecting the Second World War to causes arising from the unit level in the First World War,he continues: â€Å"If Germany, Italy, and Japan did not fulfill their territorial ambitions at the end of World War I, they might develop even more nationalistic and solidaristic regimes and try again. â€Å"19With trade and therefore interdependence at low levels in the 1930s, â€Å"economics offered no alternative possibility†; it failed to provide what he later refers to as a â€Å"mitigat[ing]† or â€Å"restraining† influence on unit-level motives for war. 0 World War I is a problematic case for Rosecrance, as it was for Angell, since the great powers went to war even though trade levels were still high. Like Angell, Rosecrance’s main defense of liberalism is that leaders simply did not see how beneficial interdependence was, and how costly war would be. Due to outmoded ideas and unit-level pathologies, they misperceived the situation; hence, interdependence could not operate as it should, as a restraint on aggression. He talks about leaders’ obsession with â€Å"nationalist ambitions† and â€Å"balance of power politics. He suggests that â€Å"no pre-1914 statesman or financier was fully aware of the damage that war would do to the European body economic† because of the irrational belief that â€Å"[war] would be over very 1 8. See Plato’s Phaedrus in Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), sections 246-256. The historical roots of this view are explicated in f b i P Albert 0. Hirschman,The Passionsand the Interests: oliticalArgumentsor Capitalism efore ts Triumph(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). He quotes Montesquieu (ibid. , p. 73): â€Å"It is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though their passions may prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so. † 19. Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, pp. 102-103 (see also p. 111). Rosecrance does point out that Germany and Japan apparently went to war also to gain raw materials (ibid. , p. 108). He does not argue, however, that these two states were more dependent than other states for such materials; to have done so would suggest the validity of the realist logic. 0. See ibid. , pp. 106, 123, 150, 162. EconomicInterdependence nd War | 15 a quickly. â€Å"21At one point, he even seems to cast doubt on the efficacy of interdependence as a restraint on aggression: One should not place too much emphasis upon the existence of interdependence per se. European nations in 1913 relied upon the trade and investment that flowed between them; that did not prevent the political crisis which led to †¦ World War I. Interdependence only constrains national policy if leaders accept and agree to work within its limits. 22 It thus appears that Rosecrance cannot really envision interdependence as being anything but a â€Å"constraint† or â€Å"restraint† on unit-level tendencies to aggress. This view is consistent with the general liberal perspective that all wars are ultimately driven by unit-level phenomena such as misperceptions, authoritarianism, ideology, and internal social conflict. Rosecrance’s historical understanding of the World War II, for example, would fit nicely with the â€Å"democratic peace† literature: had all the states in 1939 been democratic, war would probably ot have occurred despite the disrupted global economic situation, but since some states were not democratic, their aggressive domestic forces became unfettered once interdependence had declined. The idea that economic factors by themselves can push states to aggress-an argument consistent with neorealism and the alternative theory I will present below-is outside the realm of liberal thought, since it would imply that purely systemic forces can be responsible for war, largely regardless of unit-level phenomena. 3 While liberal theory certainly downplays the realist concern for the potential costs of severed trade, it is also clear that realists slight the positive role the benefits of trade can have on a state’s choice between peace and war. In the next section, I bring together the liberal emphasis on benefits with the realist emphasis on costs to create a framework for understanding the true level of dependence a state faces. This section also seeks to correct the most significant 21. See ibid. , pp. 18-19, 88, 96-97, 99, 150. 22. Ibid. , p. 141 (see also p. 150). The argument here borders on being non-falsifiable: disconfirming cases where war occurs despite high interdependence can be sidestepped by saying simply that states did not â€Å"accept† being peaceful traders. Note as well that if states have already decided to be peaceful, then interdependence is not needed as a restraint. 23. On liberalism’s inherently unit-level orientation to conflict, see Andrew Moravcsik, â€Å"Liberalism and International Relations Theory,† Working Paper, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1992; Michael Howard, War and the LiberalConscience (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978). On the democratic peace argument, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 16 error in both liberal and realist theories, namely, their lack of theoretical attention to the dynamics of state expectations for the future. o Trade r Invade? A Theory f Trade xpectations E o This section introduces the theory of trade expectations. This theory extends liberal and realist views regarding interdependence and war, by synthesizing their strengths while formulating a dynamic perspective on state decision-making that is at best only implicit in current approaches. The strength of liberalism lies in its consideration of how the benefits or gains from trade give states a material incentive to avoid war, even when they have unit-level predispositions to favor it. The strength of realism is its recognition that states may be vulnerable to the potential costs of being cut off from trade on which they depend for wealth and ultimately security. Current theories, however, lack a way to fuse the benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade into one theoretical framework. More significantly, these theories lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war. Both liberalism and realism often refer to the future trading environment, particularly in empirical analyses. But in constructing a theoretical logic, the two camps consider the future only within their own ideological presuppositions. Liberals, assuming that states seek to maximize absolute welfare, maintain that situations of high trade should continue into the foreseeable future as long as states are rational; such actors have no reason to forsake the benefits from trade, especially if defection from the trading arrangement will only lead to retaliation. 24 Given this presupposition, liberals can argue that interdependence-as reflected in high trade at any particular moment in time-will foster peace, given the benefits of trade over war. Realists, assuming states seek to maximize security, argue that concerns for relative power and autonomy will eventually push some states to sever trade ties (at least in the absence of a hegemon). Hence, realists can insist that interdependence, again manifest as high trade at any moment in time, drives dependent states to initiate war now to escape potential vulnerability later. For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism. Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a 24. See Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, appendix. EconomicInterdependence nd War | 17 a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate. Accordingly, we need a theory that incorporates how a state’s expectations of its trading environment-either optimistic or pessimistic-affect its decision-calculus for war or peace. This is where the new theory makes its most significant departure. Liberalism and realism are theories of â€Å"comparative statics,† drawing predictions from a snapshot of the level of interdependence at a single point in time. The new theory, on the other hand, is dynamic in its internal structure: it provides a new variable, the â€Å"expectations of future trade,† that incorporates in the theoretical logic an actor’s sense of the future trends and possibilities. 25 This variable is essential to any leader’s determination not just of the immediate value of peace versus war at a particular moment in time, but of the overall expected value of peace and war over the foreseeable future. From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a state’s level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war. High interdependence can be peace-inducing, as liberals maintain, as long as states expect future trade levels to be high in the future: positive expectations for future trade will lead dependent states to assign a high expected value to a continuation of peaceful trade, making war the less appealing option. If, however, a highly dependent state expects future trade to be low due to the policy decisions of the other side, then realists are likely to be correct: the state will attach a low or even negative expected value to continued peace without trade, making war an attractive alternative if its expected value is greater than peace. Moreover, since a negative expected value of trade implies a long-term decline in power, even if war is not profitable per se, it may be chosen as the lesser of two evils. 26 5. On the differences between comparative statics and dynamic analyses that incorporate the future, see Eugene Silberberg, The Structure of Economics, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), chaps. 1, 12, and 18. 26. That is, war is rational if it has either a higher net positive value or a lower net negative value. The theory thus works regardless of whether states are innately â€Å"greedy†-seeking positive gains from war-or simply security-seekers desiring to minimize long-term threats. See Charles L. Glaser, â€Å"Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,† WorldPolitics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. By connecting the trading environment to fears about relative decline, I draw upon the notion that declining states launch preventive wars to uphold their waning security. Elsewhere, I build a solely power-driven theory showing why states faced with deep and inevitable decline initiate major wars. Dale Copeland, â€Å"Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,† Security Studies, Vol. , No. 3 (Spring 1996). S 2 International ecurity 0:4 | 18 The deductive logic of the alternative theory, as with liberalism and realism, centers on an individual state’s efforts to manage its own situation of dependence. Consider a two-actor scenario, where one state â€Å"A† may trade with another state â€Å"B. † If state A moves away from the in itial position of autarchy to begin trading, and trade is free and open, it will expect to receive the benefits of trade stressed by liberals, namely, the incremental increase in A’s total welfare due to trade. 7 Note that a state can still be aware of the â€Å"benefits of trade† even if present trade is non-existent, since they represent the potential gains from trade that would accrue to the state should trade levels become high in the future. 28It is a state’s ability to foresee future potential benefits that allows it to attach a high expected value to the peaceful trading option even when current trade levels are low (as long as it expects current restrictions to be relaxed). When a state trades, it specializes in and exports goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage, while forgoing the production of other goods, which it then imports. This process of specialization, however, entails potentially large costs of adjustment if trade is subsequently cut off. This is especially so in the modern world if the state becomes dependent on foreign oil and certain raw materials. With the economy’s capital infrastructure (machines, factories, transportation systems, etc. ) geared to function only with such vital goods, a severing of trade would impose huge costs as the economy struggles to cope with the new no-trade situation. 29 In short, the severing of trade, as realists would argue, would put the state in a situation far worse than if it had never specialized in the first place. This analysis leads to a clearer understanding of any particular state’s total level of â€Å"dependence. † On a bilateral basis, that level is represented by the sum of the benefits that the state would receive from free and open trade with another state (versus autarchy), and the costs to the state of being cut off from that trade after having specialized (versus autarchy). If state A started with an economy of 100 units of GNP before any trade with B (the autarchic position), and open trade with B would mean economic expansion to a level of 110 units of GNP on an ongoing basis, then the â€Å"benefits of trade† could be considered as 10 units. If the specialization that trade entails, however, would mean the 27. This is consistent with standard trade theory. See Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, World Tradeand Payments, 4th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1985), chaps. 3-4. 28. I thank Andrew Moravcsik for discussions on the potential benefits of trade. 29. The capital investments represent â€Å"sunk costs† not easily recouped. See Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economicsof Peacemaking,pp. 26-28. EconomicInterdependence nd War I 19 a conomy would fall to 85 units should B sever trade ties, then the â€Å"costs of severed trade† would be 15 units versus autarchy. State A’s total dependence level would thus be the benefits of trade plus the costs of severed trade after specialization, or 25 units. The dependence level will itself be a function of such parameters as the overall compatibilities of the two economies for trade, the degree of A’s need for vital goods such as oil and raw materials, and t he availability of alternative suppliers and markets. Thus if A’s need for trade with B is great because the economies are highly compatible (say, in terms of mutual comparative advantages), B has valuable natural resources that A lacks, and A has few other countries to turn to, then A’s dependence can be considered high. 30 In deciding between peace and war, however, a state can not refer simply to its dependence level. Rather, it must determine the overall expected value of trade and therefore the value of continued peace into the foreseeable future. The benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade on their own say nothing about this expected value. Dynamic expectations of future trade must be brought in. If the state has positive expectations that the other will maintain free and open trade over the long term, then the expected value of trade will be close to the value of the benefits of trade. On the other hand, if the state, after having specialized, comes to expect that trade will be severed by the trading partner, then the expected value of trade may be highly negative, that is, close to the value of the costs of severed trade. In essence, the expected value of trade may be anywhere between the two extremes, depending on a state’s estimate of the expected probability of securing open trade, or of being cut off. 31 This leads to a crucial hypothesis. For any given expected value of war, we can predict that the lower the expectations of future trade, the lower the 30. On the importance of altematives, see Baldwin, â€Å"Interdependence and Power,† p. 482; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, . 13. It is worth remembering that alternative suppliers p nd markets are only valuable in reducing A’s dependence if A can get access to them. If B is able not only to sever bilateral trade, but also to blockade A to prevent third-party trading, then A effectively has no alternatives and is therefore dependent. This was the situation for Japan vis-a-vis the United States before 1941 regarding oil imports. 31. This line of reasoning is developed formally in Dale Copeland, â€Å"Modelling Econo mic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,† paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995. It is consistent with consideration of the â€Å"probability of transaction† as a determinant of expected national income in Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economicof Peacemaking,pp. 37-43, although they do not employ expectations of future trade as a theoretical variable affecting the likelihood of war. InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 20 expected value of trade, and therefore the more likely it is that war will be chosen. It is important to note that the expected value of trade will not be based on the level of trade at a particular moment in time, but upon the stream of expected trade levels into the future. It really does not matter that trade is high today: if state A knows that B will cut all trade tomorrow and shows no signs of being willing to restore it later, the expected value of trade would be negative. Similarly, it does not matter if there is little or no trade at present: if state A is confident that B is committed to freer trade in the future, the expected value of trade would be positive. The fact that the expected value of trade can be negative even if present trade is high, due to low expectations for future trade, goes a long way towards resolving such manifest anomalies for liberal theory as German aggression in World War I. Despite high levels of trade up to 1914, German leaders had good reason to believe that the other great powers would undermine this trade into the future; hence, a war to secure control over raw materials and markets was required for the long-term security of the German nation. Since the expected value of trade can be positive even though present trade is low, due to high expectations for future trade, we can also understand such phenomena as the periods of detente in U. S. -Soviet relations during the Cold War (1971-73 and after 1985). While East-West trade was still relatively low during these times, the Soviet need for Western technology, combined with a growing belief that large increases in trade with the West would be forthcoming, gave the Soviets a high enough expected value of trade to convince them to be more accommodating in superpower relations. 32 In making the final decision between peace and war, however, a rational state will have to compare the expected value of trade to the expected value of going to war with the other state. The expected value of war, as a realist would emphasize, cannot be ascertained without considering the relative power balance. As one state moves from a position of relative inferiority in economic and military power to relative superiority, the expected value of war will move from negative to positive or even highly positive. This proposition follows directly from the insights of deterrence theory: the larger the state in relative size, the higher the probability of winning a victory, while the lower the costs of fighting the war. 33 32. The U. S. -Soviet Cold War case is covered in Copeland, â€Å"Modelling Economic Interdependence and War. † 33. See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrencein AmericanForeign Policy: Theoryand Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chaps. 2-3. a EconomicInterdependence nd War | 21 Hence, if victory entails occupying the other state and absorbing its economy, war can take on a very positive expected value when a large power attacks a small state. 34 For example, if Iraq had been allowed to hold on to Kuwait after its August 1990 invasion, war for Iraq would certainly have â€Å"paid. † Similarly, Czechoslovakia was an easy and attractive target for Germany by 1938-39, as were the other smaller states of Europe, nd evidence suggests that war against these nations was indeed profitable for the Nazis. 35 On the other hand, war between more equal great powers is likely to have a much lower or even negative expected value. The Spartan leadership took Sparta into war against Athens in 431 BC, for example, under no illusions that war would be a profitable venture. 36 While the Athenian e conomy presented a large prize should victory be attained, war with a near-equal adversary could be expected to be very costly, with a low likelihood of victory. Where we would anticipate a low or negative expected value to the option of war, the expectations-of-future-trade variable should have a determinant effect on the likelihood of war. If state A has positive expectations for future trade with B, and A and B are roughly equal in relative power, then state A will assign a high expected value to continued peaceful trade, will compare this to the low or negative expected value for invasion, and will choose peace as the rational strategy. The higher A’s dependence and the higher the expectations for future trade, the higher the expected value for peaceful trade, and therefore the more likely A is to avoid war. But if state A is dependent and has negative expectations for future trade with B, then the expected value of trade will be very low or negative. If the expected value for trade is lower than the expected value for invasion, war becomes the rational choice, and this is so even when the expected value of invasion is itself negative: war becomes the lesser of two evils. 7 34. This is developed formally in Copeland, â€Å"Modelling Economic Interdependence and War. † 35. See Peter Liberman, â€Å"Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Economies† (Ph. D. diss. , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991). 36. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War,trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), Book 1, lines 80-88. 37. When one state is very large and the other very small, it is harder to sort out the effects of interdependence from the effects of relative power, at least in actual cases of war. The expected value of war for the superior state is likely to be quite positive anyway, and thus will tend to overshadow the expected value of trade even when the state has positive expectations of future trade. Here, the superior state simply chooses war as the â€Å"greater of two goods. † This choice would not be altered by any diminution of trade expectations; indeed, war would simply be even more rational as the expected value of trade (and therefore peace) falls. War in such a situation of marked power imbalance and low expectations of future trade is thus overdetermined; it would be difficult to tell whether war occurred because of the positive expected value of war, the negative expected value of trade, or both. Thus, in my empirical analysis, I examine cases where great powers InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 22 Until now, I have talked about state A’s â€Å"expectations of future trade† as though they were an essentially exogenous, that is, as though state B, in its willingness to trade with A, were not affected by A’s behavior. If, however, state A, by making political, military, or economic concessions, can induce B to relax trading restrictions, then A’s low expectations for future trade may be raised. This suggests that the effects of diplomacy and bargaining need to be integrated into any extended historical analysis. 38 The probability of B trading with A is never completely independent of A’s actions, since there is always some concession that A could make to get B to commit to higher trade levels over the long term. But the problem for A is that B’s price for high trade may be unacceptable in that it undermines A’s internal stability or its external power position. To take an extreme example, if B were to demand, as the price for higher trade, that A unilaterally disarm and allow B to occupy A with its army, it is hard to imagine A accepting such a deal. If B remains unwilling to budge from such an exorbitant demand, then it is fair to say that A’s pessimistic expectation for future trade is exogenous; there is little A can do, short of national suicide, to improve the likelihood of trade. Thus state A, in estimating B’s probability of trading with A, will refer to many indicators suggesting how â€Å"reasonable† B will be into the future, that is, how willing B will be to trade, and at what price. One may think of these indicators simply as causal factors affecting the variable â€Å"expectations of future trade. † Such systemic factors as B’s economic competitiveness, B’s rate of depletion of raw materials and energy reserves (affecting its future export ability), and military pressures constraining B’s trade with A will be important. German leaders before World War I, for example, had good reason to believe that Britain would be forced to move to imperial preference to protect its empire from the German economic challenge and to lend support to its entente partners. Japanese leaders in the late 1930s recognized that the United States would have to cut back on oil and iron exports to Japan as U. S. reserves were attacked great powers in long and costly total wars. While these cases do not cover the universe of wars, they do isolate the role of economic interdependence and changing expectations of future trade in the outbreak of war. 8. Given space constraints, my case studies in this article do not provide a full analysis of the bargaining dynamic. For an analysis of interstate economic bargaining, see Baldwin, Economic Statecraft,chap. 6; R. Harrison Wagner, â€Å"Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence,† InternationalOrganization,Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461-483. Note also that there may be a causal feedback loop, whereby increasing fears of war lead others to reduce trade, which in turn heightens the incentive of dependent states to initiate war. These and other issues involving the endogeneity of trade expectations are addressed more fully in my book manuscript, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and War. † EconomicInterdependence nd War | 23 a depleted or needed to supply a military buildup (even one directed only at Germany). Such systemic pressures on B to reduce trade with A will foster negative expectations of future trade among A’s leaders. But domestic and personal factors can also play a significant role in the exogenous rise or decline in B’s likelihood of trading with A, indicating hat the assumption that B is a â€Å"unitary actor† must be relaxed to some degree when examining history. 39 In 1972, for example, the Soviets saw Nixon and Kissinger as firmly in control of American policy, and therefore able to carry through on commitments to increase East-West trade. Two years later, however, such a positive expectation for future trade could not be sustained in the wake of Watergate and the r eassertion of Congressional power, at least at a price which was reasonable to the Soviets. This had much to do with the failure of detente, as I argue elsewhere. 40 A comparison of the arguments of trade expectations theory with those of liberal and realist theory is presented in Table 1. To summarize: liberals contend that high economic dependence, as manifest in high trade levels, reduces a state’s likelihood of initiating war by providing a material â€Å"constraint† on unit-level forces for aggression. Low dependence will increase this likelihood, since this constraint on unit-level motives for war is removed. Realists argue that high dependence heightens the probability of war as dependent states struggle to reduce their vulnerability. In the realist world, however, low dependence should have no impact on the likelihood of war or peace; that is, other factors should become causally determinant of war. Still, since economic interdependence is at least eliminated as a possible source of conflict, realists 39. Note that state A, the decision-making unit in the theory, can still be treated as a rational unitary actor respondingto the observed domestic forces on the other side. 0. See Copeland, â€Å"Modeling Economic Interdependence and War,†pp. 62-66. International trade institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by lowering transaction costs and facilitating the punishment of cheaters, may be an additional means to build positive expectations for future trade. Indeed, for some liberals, peace may only be likely when both interdependence and effective glob al institutions co-exist and reinforce one another; Keohane, â€Å"International Liberalism Reconsidered,† p. 183. While such institutions may indeed affect trade expectations, they are unlikely to be as significant in history as the systemic and domestic factors just discussed, for the simple reason that these institutions are a creation of the post-World War II era. Moreover, since concerns for war and peace revolve mostly around the great powers, and powers like Soviet Union and China have been historically excluded from trade institutions like GATT, such institutions cannot account for fluctuations in the levels of tension between the United States and these powers since 1945. Finally, the institutional approach overlooks bilateraldiplomacy as the principal mechanism through which expectations of trade change; consider the United States and Japan up to December 1941, or the United States and Japan today. Accordingly, while my argument recognizes the contribution institutions can make to the improvement of future trade expectations, the focus both theoretically and empirically remains fundamentally non-institutional. 2 S International ecurity 0:4 | 24 4– C/) CO D C o C CD co -0 Co 0 0 0 C CO N E cn C 0 0 -;– a) co C 0 +-, w CM C0 w n E C CD+M † 1 CD CD :3 C CO C CD 0 :3 +, -0 0 m W W cn CD4- ‘a cn 0 c: c CD 0 D- 0 m N C C: W CD CD cn E +, an c 0 +. ,cn Cn CO CD 0 u – :3 0 -0 CC CD a CD 0 Co 0 0 0 +, cn co co o co co CL 0 C CD :3 - C-D C W 0 co E cD w C co C Ew CD C C CD E E0 CD C 0) Cn CD - 77 cn 0 CD 0 CD E C -C W CD -0 +, C cn 0 CD CD Cn a ‘. CD CD co C co co 0 -i cn 0 0 co CD CD a rCO CD CD Co w 0 W W C: CD co CL W cn :3 -0 CD E 00 -0 cn ‘a C C LrCD 0 = cn +, C – C CD CD C -0 CD CO CD la Co C: CD -0 cn +, C: CD CD CD 0 co CDcn 0 CD +†, cn -C n :3 0 0 w 40 . C: 0W F n0 m 0 CD CD m m CD CD 0 z +1 CD -C CM F: -C CD – CD 0 CD 0) Cn ‘a o C -C 0 C C CD 0 CD4- C C Co , -C: CD+n 0 c w co W0 † :L’ cn cn CD m o 0 co CD 0 0Cw 0 !E c CD o o cn Cn CD CO co w C C: C w 0 wW w cD ‘D E w co mm co CD E W W CD Co -C +. W -C N -E CM CD 0 4= 0 D co C † +1 co cn -C CD +1 w -C -C L- CD +-, Co +, cn FL 0 E CD +-, cn w E CD 4- o C co 0 -C cn CD cn 0 Cn CD w +, CD C co 0 CM -; 0 C w -C C 0 CD M Q) ‘-0 + CD C , -FU-0 )w Q0 – co 0 C 0 +1 † 0 CD– C cn co x â€Å"W O † CD 0 0 n co 0 CD m C. ) C co 0 W cn D- CM CD cn w w cn C: o CD m CD cn C 0 E 0 0 cn w x wx 0 C C) cn :3 0 w m CMCD CD co CM -0 +’ – C +’ -0 +’ -C CO 0 0 0 = CD+’ CD -C CD+o’ +†, co c 0 C co cn C w co cn CC w0 w 0 4- n La C: 0 c3 : 0 :3 C :3 CD cn 0 C CD w x w C 40 -CM C CD :3 CD ‘C-D -C cn co C 0 cn a w C0 0 -0 C 0 CD 0 -C :3 a CD an c CD +-, 0 CD cci:3 :3 CD CD † m C CD CD CD C: 0 CD :3 CD M cn 0 +’ co C +’ CD -0 0 ‘a co co 0 W C CO C: co :3 -cD Q. , co CD CD -0 -W0 co w x cn +-, cn 0 0 0 0 co co cn :L C co a C0 C-D C w0 C/) cn E -FU CO CD +1 – C) CL How to cite Economic Interdependence, Essay examples

Types of Departmentalization Used by Business free essay sample

Every organisation has certain basic parts that are made up of people who perform, supervise, and plan besides those who render support services and technical advice. As such, studying the structure or design of an organisation means analysing how these parts are put together, who reports to whom, the degree of centralisation or decision making power concentrated at the top, the extent of rules, policies, regulations, and procedures in the organisation.The building of the initial structure of an organisation may be based on the conditions prevailing in the society and the industry characteristics prevailing at the time and the personality of the founder (entrepreneur). As the organisations grow in their size from small to large over a period of time, their priorities do change and it becomes necessary for the organisations to make changes in the organisation design in order to ensure that the organisations function efficiently.In any discussion of Organizational Structure, it’ s helpful to become acquainted with a few key terms that describe specific aspects of business organization practices. Very simply, Organizational Structure is the manner in which an organization arranges itself. Once an organization investigates its options and decides upon how it’s going to structure itself, it’s common to draw up an Organizational Chart. An Organizational Chart Some organizations consider their Organizational Charts as confidential, while other organizations most of them, in fact, do not.Some companies go so far as to post their Organizational Charts on their publicly accessible websites. Other key terms include Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making. Centralized decision making refers to a business model in which decisions are directed to the top of the organization. Decentralized decision making is a model in which the organization tends to push the decisions down to the lowest levels, which can be a good thing.With decentralized decision making, the benefit is that the individuals who best know the company’s processes are those lower in the organization, those who roll up their sleeves and work with the processes every day. Theoretically, such individuals are in a better position to respond to external and internal drivers and make rapid decisions to control those drivers before they get out of hand and negatively affect the organization. Decentralized decision making tends to be a trap, as it may dangerously undermine upper management in the organization.Nonetheless, decentralized decision making is increasingly accepted as a viable business model today. Yet another key term is one known as Formalization, the degree to which an organization tends to document its processes, rules, and regulations. Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making and Formalization will vary from one organizational structure to another, depending upon the options for change that are open to a company. Another key term that is familiar in the designing an organization is what we call a Hierarchy of Authority.The concept of Hierarchy of Authority says that an organization must know who is in charge of which elements and who r eports to whom. Of course, this has implications for the division of labour because, under the Hierarchy of Authority, many tasks are divided and distributed across the organization. This process necessarily entails varying degrees of specialization of jobs and tasks, which we see a lot these days as the business environment grows more sophisticated. Regarding Types of Organizational Structures, I will first critically note that an appropriate organizational structure for any given company is a very elusive animal, indeed.Every company tends to organize itself differently, so there is no absolute right and no absolute wrong way to design an organization. Appropriate organizational structure depends upon the unique strategy of the business, its unique customer base, its unique sense of products and services, and its management of these considerations as they are dispersed throughout the enterprise. The most common organizational types may be classified as Functional Structure, Divisional Structure, Matrix Structure. A Few Common Types of Departmentalization Functional departmentalization Grouping activities by functions performed. Activities can be grouped according to function (work being done) to pursue economies of scale by placing employees with shared skills and knowledge into departments for example human resources, IT, accounting, manufacturing, logistics, and engineering. Functional departmentalization can be used in all types of organizations. . Product departmentalization Grouping activities by product line. Tasks can also be grouped according to a specific product or service, thus placing all activities related to the product or the service under one manager. Each major product area in the corporation is under the authority of a senior anager who is specialist in, and is responsible for, everything related to the product line. LA Gear is an example of company that uses product departmentalization. Its structure is based on its varied product lines which include women’s footwear, children’s footwear and men’s’ footwear. Customer departmentalization Grouping activities on the basis of common customers or types of customers. Jobs may be grouped according to the type of customer served by the organization. The assumption is that customers in each department have a common set of problems and needs that can best be met by specialists.The sales activities in an office supply firm can be broken down into three departments that serve retail, wholesale and government accounts. Geographic departmentalization Grouping activities on the basis of territory. If an organization’s customers are geographically dispersed, it can group jobs based on geography. For example, the organization structure of Coca-Cola has reflected the company’s operation in two broad geographic areas, the North region sector and the Central region sector, which includes the Kuala Lumpur, the Selangor, Negeri Sembilan.Process departmentalization Grouping activities on the basis of product or service or customer flow. Because each process requires different skills, process departmentalization allows homogenous activities to be categorized. For example, the applicants might need to go through several departments namely validation, licensing and treasury, before receiving the driver’s license. Functional Structure adopting by Telekom Malaysia Berhad The Functional Structure is by far the most popular organizational structure in the business world.Probably 65% to 75% of companies use the Functional Structure, because it’s basic and it makes sense. The Functional Structure is how most organizations align themselves into various departments for example, Quality Management, Information Technology, Corporate Communication, Finance, Sales and service. Within the Functional Structure, people of similar skill sets are grouped together and managed by somebody who presumably knows a great deal about those skill sets. Advantages and Disadvantages of The Functional Approach First of all, the Functional Structure follows the Centralized DecisionMaking model, such that decision making in the Functional Structure occurs at the top. This can be advantageous in the sense that there is more upper management control in the organization. It can also help individuals in their career paths, inasmuch as motivated employees move upward within the organization to assume decision-making positions. For example, you come in from college, join the Accounting Department as a Junior Accountant, move up to Accountant, and then move up to Senior Accountant, it’s a very well-defined career path.Functional Structures foster stability and efficiency. Everybody knows what his job is, and as a group they all use similar processes, so it’s a very e ffective way of operating. When you’re working with this type of structure, you can also take advantage of economies of scale. Of course, the Functional Structure has its disadvantages, as well. Perhaps the most critical disadvantage is that of poor communication and conflict between departments. A great deal of literature on Functional Structure is focused on the effect of what we call Siloing.Siloing is when an organization has very thick walls, so that the various departments are entirely isolated from one another, and members of those departments don’t think in terms of company-wide teamwork. They only attend the business of their specific department. Communication and collaboration between the departments is difficult, at best, and this is not a good organizational situation. Also, customers can become frustrated by the lack of responsiveness from organizations that are functionally structured.The scenario of customer complaints â€Å"passed off† from one department to another is familiar to most of us. Another disadvantage of the Functional Structure is that employees tend to identify themselves with their respective departments but not so much with the organization as a whole. Although the Functional Structure is the most popular and pervasive in the business world, companies should understand that the siloing effect is potentially detrimental to individual employees, departments, and the organization as a whole. Divisional Structure adopting by Kolej Tunku Abdul RahmanThe Divisional Structure is not so much based on the grouping of people according to their skill sets as it is concerned with placing groups of people with similar abilities where they are needed all across the organization. For instance, while under the Functional Structure you w ould expect to find accountants only in the Accounting Department, under the Divisional Structure you will find accountants in different divisions of the same company, in separate Accounting Departments which are dedicated to separate product lines.As you can see , each state branch has its own Functional Organization with operation, accounts, and marketing teams, permitting each prostate branch to function independently of the other product lines. Yet each product line is a component of a larger organization. Advantages and Disadvantages of The Divisional Structure The advantage of the Divisional Structure lies mainly in the coordination of functions within the separate divisions. Behind any single product group or market group or geographic group is one person who is in charge of all the functions within his division.This improves the ability of a company to respond to customer issues, because there is more accountability. Everyone in a given division reports to a single individual at the top of the division, rather than to a mere supervisor of a department. This arrangement also helps to develop managerial skills and executive skills, because people working in a Divisional Structure are exposed to all of the other functions, unlike the siloing effect seen in a straight Functional Structure.The disadvantage of the Divisional Structure lies in redundant effort and resources due to multiple departments performing essentially t he same tasks across the organization, which spells inefficiency on many levels. Within the Divisional Structure there is also a reduction in specialization and occupational skills, not to mention a high probability of in-house competition between the various divisions of the company. A divisional structure also has weaknesses. A company comprised of competing divisions may allow office politics instead of sound strategic thinking to affect its view on such matters as allocation of company resources.Thus, one division will sometimes act to undermine another. Also, divisions can bring compartmentalization that can lead to incompatibilities. For example, Microsofts business-software division developed the Social Connector in Microsoft Office Outlook 2010. They were unable to integrate Microsoft SharePoint and Windows Live until months after Social Connector could interface with MySpace and LinkedIn. Some experts suggested that Microsofts divisional structure contributed to a situation where its own products were incompatible across internal business units.Divisional Structure adopting by Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman Matrix structures are increasingly used in organisations as they become more complex and as the pace of change increases. They are similar to project management arrangements, although matrix structures may be a permanent feature. Matrix structures, like project management, involve the creation and management of multi-disciplinary teams. The team leaders have a dual reporting relationship. For the structures to work effectively they should only be introduced when appropriate and even then after careful planning.An important aspect is the training of multi-disciplinary team leaders. However, it can also be crucial to ensure that those other key members of management who need to monitor and support matrix structures are properly selected and have received appropriate management training. For example, the matrix structure adopting by Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman where the academic registrar has representative from head of school, course coordinator and course leader and its lead by the dean. The academic registrar will be operates similar to project which need involvement from few departments.Advantages and Disadvantages of The Matrix Structure The advantage of the Matrix Structure is that it’s extremely efficient, particularly when resources are scarce. This organizational structure is a very good way to ensure that expensive specialists are kept busy all the time and that they are using their skills on the most critical portions of a project for the good of the organization. It also allows an organization to start projects quickly, because there’ s no need to hire staff from outside.The staff is readily available, and they are already acquainted with the pace, so projects can be launched very quickly. A Functional/ (Weak) Matrix organizational structure, such as our client company had in place, works well when the focus is on quality and technical expertise. Under this structure, functional managers are responsible for products created within their areas of expertise. The downside: In the company on which this case study was based, it just wasnt working. And their experience was not uncommon.The functional- based organization structure tends to undermine the authority and decision-making capability of project managers, making project success more difficult. The functional or weak matrix form of organization does have some advantages. In this case, first of all, it was the currently existing state in the client organization. Change is always traumatic in organizations and, to the extent that we could preserve existing processes and systems, the upheaval-and resistance to it-would be minimized.Functional stovepipe organizations take a beating in discussions of optimal organizational structure, but the fact is that they are familiar to people, and thus comfortable for them. In addition, within this structure, IT and IS departments are fully empowered to complete isolated projects within their own stovepipes. The client organization already possessed well-established communications processes and authorities within the functional areas.From a purely logistical point of view, the staff work locations were already centralized around functional department assignments, making information sharing among team members more straightforward. The Matrix Structure also helps develop cross-functional skills in employees, as they are dealing with many different types of projects, working with and learning from many othe r participants with a diversity of skill sets. The Matrix also increases employee involvement because the project managers seldom possess all the necessary technical and functional knowledge. They rely on the expertise of those â€Å"borrowed† staffers to make more decisions at a technical level. The main disadvantage of the Matrix Structure, certainly, is that many employees become very frustrated and confused with the chain-of-command in these hastily-assembled support teams. Who’s the boss? My department head or my project manager? There are also conflicts between project and department managers concerning deadlines and priorities. There can be competition between project managers to acquire the â€Å"best† project support staff from the finite pool of available people.